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RECENT DECISIONS

rearing that accompany illegitimacy invite a comparison to defamation
and support actions. Similar comparisons can be made with other tort
actions that should provide additional bases for compensation in illegitimacy cases.
Negligence that causes a person to be born a bastard is actionable.
The bastard child should be awarded sufficient damages to compensate
him for a disability arising from that wrong. It is incumbent upon our
courts and skilled counsel to create a standard to determine the scope
and extent of damages that will constitute substantial redress. Their
efforts may well result in damages that are "bastards" among traditional
tort damages.
It is fundamental to our common-law system that one may ask
redress for-every substantial wrong.

.

. Although fraud, extra

litigation and a measure of speculation are, of course, possibilities, it is no reason for a court to eschew a measure of its
jurisdiction."
Charles J.Weyandt

LAw-Right to Counsel-Accused's right to counsel
attaches at the accusatory stage of the proceedings even though no request for counsel is made.
CONSTrIrUTIONAL

United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir.
1965).
Petitioners Russo and Bisignano, and a fellow defendant, LaPierre, were
arrested after an attempted robbery of a Newark, New Jersey tavern in
which an off-duty policeman was killed and one of the robbers wounded.
Russo, who was suffering from a gunshot wound, was taken to a hospital
where the bullet was removed. Having implicated himself in the crimes,
Russo signed a confession shortly after his release from the hospital.
Bisignano had already admitted his role in the crimes, and, after several
hours of questioning, he signed a confession. Neither Russo nor Bisignano
was advised of his right to counsel before signing a confession.
The trio was indicted and convicted of murder. Having exhausted their
state remedies and rights of appeal,' defendants Russo and Bisignano
applied to the federal district court in New Jersey for writs of habeas
corpus. The writs were sought by the defendants on the ground, inter
13. Battella v. State of New York, 291 N.Y.S.2d 34, 36, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730 (1961),
where the court overruled a case that was followed for sixty-five years.
1. State v. LaPierre, 39 N.J. 156,-188 A.2d 10 (1963). Certiorari was denied Bisignano.
Bisignano v. New Jersey, 374 U.S. 852 (1963)6 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254.

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:317

alia,2 that they had been denied their right to counsel. The district court
denied the writs. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that defendants had been
denied their constitutional right to counsel.3
In so holding, the court found the rule established in Escobedo v.
Illinois4 to apply even though no request for counsel was made. In
Escobedo the Supreme Court held that "when the process shifts from
investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its
purpose is to elicit a confession-our adversary system begins to operate,
and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to
consult with his lawyer."5 Since Danny Escobedo had requested and
been denied the advice of counsel, that case is factually distinguishable
from the instant case where no request was made. Speaking for the
court, Chief Judge Biggs found that the factual distinction did not require
application of a different legal standard. "We can perceive no sound
basis for holding that a request for counsel is a prerequisite for the right
to counsel at the interrogation stage while it is not at any other .

. . .

The

court's refusal to distinguish Escobedo places it in opposition to numerous
other decisions. Many courts, state and federal, have found Escobedo's
proscription of confessions obtained in the absence of counsel to be contingent upon a prior request for counsel by the accused.' The court in the
instant case also rejected the assertion that the accused had waived
counsel by failing to make such a request.
No sound reasoning that we can discover will support the
2. The court held that petitioners' assertions of physical coercion and mental overbearing were untenable in view of the evidence. Petitioners also contended that the confessions were obtained during a period of illegal detention. The court stated that the
exclusionary rule expressed in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) and McNabb
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) did not give rise to a constitutional prohibition since
that rule was the result of the Supreme Court's supervisory powers over federal prosecutions.
3. United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965), petition
for rehearing and petition for leave to intervene as amici curiae denied.
4. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
5. Id. at 492.
6. United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, supra note 3, at 437.
7. Jackson v. United States, 337 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935
(1965) ; United States ex rel. Townsend v. Ogilvie, 334 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 984 (1965); Mitchell v. Stephens, 232 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Ark. 1964);
People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill. App. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964), cert. denied, U.S.
(1965); Sturgis v. State, 235 Md. 343, 201 A.2d 681 (1964); State v. Scanlon, 84
N.J. Super. 427, 202 A.2d 448 (1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Linde v. Maroney, 416
Pa. 331, 206 A.2d 288 (1965) ; Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 131 N.W.2d 169 (1964).
This court, however, is not alone in its interpretation of Escobedo. See People v.
Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965);
Commonwealth v. McCarthy, Mass. -,
200 N.E.2d 264 (1964); State v. Dufour,
R.I. -,
206 A.2d 82 (1965).
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conclusion that although at other stages in the proceedings in
which the right attaches there must be an intelligent waiver, at
the interrogation level a failure to request counsel may be
deemed a waiver.'
Although the rule established by the Supreme Court in Escobedo did
not specify whether a request for counsel was necessary, Justice White,
in his dissent, indicated that the decision was not so limited.
Although the opinion purports to be limited to the facts of this
case, it would be naive to think that the new constitutional right
announced will depend upon whether the defendant has retained
his own counsel . .. or has asked to consult with counsel in the
course of the interrogation .... At the very least the court holds
that once the accused becomes a suspect and, presumably, is
arrested, any admission made to police thereafter is inadmissible
in evidence unless the accused has waived his right to counsel.9
It would appear that the right was not dependent upon Danny Escobedo's request, but that the right matured at the critical accusatory stage
of the proceedings.
Of what value is such a constitutional right if it is available only to
those making such a request? It would seem that the policy of the Supreme Court with respect to the rights of the accused would be hindered
by a narrow interpretation of Escobedo. The purpose of the Escobedo
rule is to assure the defendant a fair trial by rendering a confession
obtained from him inadmissible when he has been denied his constitutional
right to counsel at the accusatory stage of the proceeding. Knowledge of
the right to counsel is essential to all defendants, ignorant as well as
knowledgeable, so that they may prepare their defense and in this way
be assured a constitutionally fair trial. When such a fundamental right
is involved it should not be left to the hazard of a request.'
Although the holding in the instant case has created what has been
called a "judicial power struggle,"" the merits of the court's reasoning
cannot be ignored. In the case of Carnley v. Cochran,2 the Supreme
Court concluded that "it is settled that where the assistance of counsel is
a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not de8. United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, supra note 3, at 438.
9. Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 4, at 495.
10. Comment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 337 (1965); Comment, 25 MD. L. REV. 165 (1965).
11. Trial, June-July, 1965, p. 45. "Chief Judge Joseph Weintraub of the New Jersey
Supreme Court on June 9 directed all state judges to ignore the landmark decisionan extremely unusual action."
"The state directive was not made public. It creates a judicial power struggle which
must be resolved only by the U.S. Supreme Court."
12. 369 U.S. 506 (1962). See also Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
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pend on a request."' The Court in that case noted that the failure to provide counsel to the accused in a case as complex as the one before the
Court resulted in a violation of the defendant's right to "due process"
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court in Russo also indicated that advising the defendant of his
right to remain silent would not be sufficient, but that he should also be
explicitly advised of his right to counsel.
In reviewing the facts of Escobedo, it is apparent that Escobedo was well informed of his constitutional rights since some
days previously he had conferred with counsel and it must be
assumed, as the Supreme Court did assume, that counsel had
informed Escobedo of his right to remain silent and the effect
any statement that he made might have. Yet the Supreme Court
held that such prior instructions were inadequate when Escobedo was faced with the incriminating statements of his alleged
partner in crime. 4
Although the Russo decision did not establish a rule on the retrospective
application of Escobedo,1 5 it appears from the facts before the court that
Escobedo was applied retrospectively. Senior Judge Forman, concurring
with the Per Curiam denial on Petition for Rehearing and on Petition for
Leave to Intervene as Amici Curiae, noted that Russo's conviction was
final in 1963 as determined by the test of finalization announced by the
Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker, 6 while Escobedo was not decided
until 1964.1"
The Court in Linkletter decided that Mapp v. Ohio'" was not to be
applied retrospectively. The Supreme Court in that case held that it
"must weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior
history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective application will further or retard its operations," 9 in deciding
whether or not a decision is to be applied retrospectively. The conclusion
in that case was that Linkletter was not denied a fundamentally fair trial
13. Carnley v. Cochran, supra note 12, at 513.
14. United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, supra note 3 at 438.
15. See Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670 (1965).
16. 381 U.S. 618, 622 (1965). The Supreme Court pointed out that a judgment is
final when the "conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the
time for certiorari had elapsed . .. .

17. Russo's conviction was affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1963. See
State v. LaPierre, 39 N.J. 156, 188 A.2d 10 (1963). The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari in the same year. See Bisignano v. New Jersey, 374 U.S. 852 (1963).
18. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Mapp case held that evidence obtained through an
illegal search and seizure could not be admitted into evidence in a state trial. The Supreme
Court applied the "illegal search and seizure" clause of the Fourth Amendment to the
states through the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
19. Linkletter v. Walker, supra note 16, at 629.
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since the evidence introduced was reliable despite the fact that it had
been illegally seized.
At least two courts have concluded that under the Linkletter holding,
Escobedo should be applied only prospectively." A contrary view was
expressed by Judge Forman in his opinion on the Petition for Rehearing
in Russo.21 Justice Black, dissenting in In Re Groban,' noted that
"[T]he right to use counsel at the formal trial is a very hollow thing when,
for all practical purposes the conviction is assured by pretrial examination."2 Escobedo remedied this factor by extending the right to counsel
to the accusatory stage of the proceedings. The purpose of this extension
was to insure protection of the constitutional rights of the accused so that
he may not be denied a fundamentally fair trial. The Court in Linkletter
noted that retrospective application has been given to three recent
decisions involving constitutionally protected rights.24 That Court stated
that ".

.

. in each of the three areas in which we have applied our rule

retrospectively the principle went to the fairness of the trial-the very
integrity of the fact finding process."2 One of the cases referred to by the
Court was Gideon v. Wainwright26 which guaranteed the accused the
right of counsel at the trial. Escobedo is a logical extension of this right
to the pretrial interrogation. As Judge Forman in Russo concluded, the
pretrial interrogation also affects the "very integrity of the fact finding
process." It would seem, therefore, that the correct application of Linkletter to the rule in Escobedo would require that that decision be applied
retrospectively.
Steven K. Yablonski

LAw-Right to Counsel-The right to counsel attaches
at an accusatorial proceeding even though not requested. The rule announced in Escobedo v. Illinois will not be applied retrospectively to cases
finally adjudicated before Escobedo v. Illinois was decided.
CONSTITUTIONAL

Commonwealth v. Negri, 419 Pa. 117, 213 A.2d 670 (1965).
May all those incarcerated in a Pennsylvania penal institution who had
their cases finally adjudicated prior to June 22, 1964, and had been denied
the right of counsel before trial, rest in peace. Their hopes of gaining
freedom under the rule of Escobedo v. Illinois' have vanished with the
20. United States ex rel. Walden v. Pate, 350 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1965).
21. United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, supra note 3.
22. 352 U.S. 330 (1956).
23. Id. at 345.
24. Linkletter v. Walker, supra note 16, at 628, n.13.
25. Id. at 639.
26. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
1. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).

